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Abstract: The objective of the paper is to elaborate a simulation model to analyze inter- 
and intra-modal competition in the transport industry, based on game theory models. In our 
setting, consumers choose a transport mode and an operator to travel on a given city-pair; 
operators strategically decide on prices for the types of service they provide. We derive the 
market equilibrium and simulate potential scenarios. In particular we measure the impact of 
entry by a low cost train operator and the effect of a kerosene tax. Hence our framework could 
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Introduction 
 
This paper presents a simulation model to analyze inter- and intra-modal competition in 
the transport industry, based on game theory models. In our setting, consumers choose a mode 
and an operator to travel on a given city-pair, and firms decide on service quality and prices. 
From these assumptions we derive the market equilibrium and simulate potential scenarios. 
The model allows us to evaluate the effects of both structural and regulatory changes on a 
particular market. More precisely, we are able to measure the impacts of either entry by a new 
rail operator, or a change in the regulatory framework with the introduction of a kerosene tax 
for example. In this sense the model could serve as a tool to measure the effectiveness of 
competition on a relevant market or to design marketing strategies. 
These issues arise within a context of successive liberalization processes in the world, and 
more particularly in Europe. The airline industry was the first passenger transport sector to be 
deregulated and open to competition. In Europe, the process started in 1987 to end up in 1992 
with the “third package”, the full implementation of liberalization laws becoming effective in 
1997. Airlines are then free to set prices, there are no limits in capacity shares, and all airlines 
from the community have free access to the market. Moreover, the evolution of the general 
network configuration into a hub-and-spokes network, and the incentives for companies to 
reduce costs, increase connections and boost demand, has induced a recent effect on 
competition in this sector. As this network structure imposes barriers to the entry of new 
operators on the quasi-monopolistic routes originating from the hub, a new category of 
airlines entered on some niche markets, specifically, on point-to-point routes. These 
companies are characterized by very low costs allowing them to propose lower prices. Some 
Low Costs Airlines are highly profitable and are gaining more and more market share in the 
European market. These two main changes in the structure of the air transport industry, the 
deregulation and the entry of Low Cost Airlines, make intra-modal competition tougher and 
tougher in this sector. 
The liberalization process of the European railways industry started in 1991. The 
European Commission, in its Directive 91/440, announces three main objectives to promote 
railways: to increase their market share, to reduce subsidies and to liberalize access to 
infrastructure to enhance competition. However, the provisions of Directive 91/440 do not go 
far enough as they only apply to international cooperations in cross border transport and do 
not include cabotage. Only a few countries have gone b eyond the EU regulation, introduced 
competition and experienced the entry of new competitors on their tracks, notably UK and 
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Germany. The EU commission has initiated a new directive to fully open up international 
passenger rail transport. Once the market is open, competition should be expected to happen 
quite rapidly as existing railways companies face lower entry costs than totally new entrants. 
This new intra-modal competition in the railways sector is expected to develop in all 
European countries, including the most recent additions to the EU. It would change the whole 
nature of competition in this industry. 
Before the 1990’s, rail and air transport were considered as two modes not competing with 
each other, because of the large differences existing in the services provided, for example 
concerning travel time and tariffs. This is not true anymore. The development of High Speed 
technology reduced considerably the gap between air and train travel time from city-center to 
city-center, and the appearance of Low Cost Airlines makes plane tickets affordable by a high 
share of the population. So not only airlines and train operators are facing separately intra-
model competition, but now these technical and structural changes introduce a real and fierce 
inter-modal competition between airlines and train operators. Antes, Friebel, Niffka and 
Rompf (2004) investigate these effects in a case study on the entry of Low Cost Airlines on 
the German passenger transportation market. 
Finally these two industries have also to account for the most important competitor in 
terms of market shares, namely private car, with the advantage of providing full scope for the 
driver to travel at any time. 
The preceding analysis leads us to the need of considering transport between an origin and 
a destination as one market with differentiated products competing with each other. Now, 
passengers can choose between several modes and even several companies or alternatives 
within modes to provide them the transport service they are looking for. 
This product differentiation is due to the fact that passengers have different valuations for 
the service offered by an operator, and it is used strategically by competitors to avoid a fierce 
price competition. Proposing different services, the operators target different segments of the 
population, and this behavior affects pricing decisions.1 When such a market is being 
analyzed empirically, several questions arise. The first one deals with the determination of the 
number of products on the market, requiring a precise analysis of consumers’ choices usually 
collected through questionnaires. Fortunately, in mode choice modeling, the number of 
alternatives is usually small. Secondly, from an econometric point of view, one should be 
aware of the important data collection needed in such disaggregated models. Precise 
                                                 
1 IDEI (2003) discusses the role of product differentiation in the competition process in details. 
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information is required concerning the socioeconomic status of the traveler (income, 
household composition, etc), the nature of the trip (motivation), and the characteristics of 
alternative modes (travel time, frequency, etc). These data are usually gathered through time 
demanding and costly questionnaire surveys, each of them being specific to the city-pair 
under consideration, as well as the category of consumers. We present later a methodology 
avoiding the difficult task of collecting rare and detailed data for a specific application. 
 In this particular differentiated-product market, we model demand and supply in order to 
recover equilibrium outcomes. Market demand is derived from a general class of discrete 
choice models of consumer behavior. Travelers can first choose the mode they want to travel 
with, then within this mode, decide on a specific service. For this discrete choice structure, an 
appropriate specification for an empirical analysis is the nested logit model. On the supply 
side, firms determine prices and quality of the service they provide. Market outcomes are 
derived within the context of a Nash equilibrium. Firms behave strategically: Each of them 
determines its prices knowing that its competitors do the same. An increase in one firm’s 
price has a positive impact on its margin but a negative one on its traffic. This can lead to a 
traffic increase for the other competitors who may want in turn to set slightly higher prices to 
increase their margins. The equilibrium outcomes are then dependent on own- and cross-price 
demand elasticities. 
 This essential aspect of competition is usually left aside in models analyzing only the 
demand side of the market. Preston, Wardman and Whelan (1999) analyze the impact of entry 
on an inter-city rail line. They estimate a demand model, a cost model, and simulate different 
forms of competition. However they do not have a partial equilibrium model. They find that 
competition is possible in a situation with costs reductions and/or product differentiation. 
More recently, Johnson and Whelan (2003) present a demand-cost model developed by the 
Institute of Transport Studies (University of Leeds), to look at the potential for on-track 
competition in the UK. They use it to measure the impact of alternative ticket sales on one 
city-pair and find some significant differences in terms of revenue. Another study conducted 
by Glass (2003) applies the same demand-cost model as the one used by Johnson and Whelan 
to another particular link, incorporating a game theoretical model, and his main conclusion is 
that head-on competition in the market is socially desirable because the increase in consumer 
surplus more than compensates firms’ losses. However note that all these studies concentrate 
only on intra-modal competition and do not consider inter-modal competition, and they do not 
account for competitors’ reactions to a change in the market, leading to a new equilibrium. 
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As an example, we apply our model of intra- and inter- modal competition to a particular 
city-pair in Germany, specifically the link Cologne-Berlin. This link is of particular interest 
here because all forms of competition described earlier are represented: a national air carrier 
Lufthansa (LH), three Low Costs Airlines, the rail incumbent operator Deutsche Bahn AG 
(DB), the threat of entry from other railways, and road.  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the city-pair and associated data 
chosen to apply our methodology. Section 3 presents the demand-and-supply model on this 
market and discusses the equilibrium features. Then the calibration method is explained in 
section 4. Finally, section 5 provides the results of counterfactual experiments, which allows 
us to evaluate the implications of potential evolutions on the market configuration, such as the 
plausible entry of a low cost rail competitor, or the regulatory changes affecting costs of the 
companies present on the market. Section 6 draws some preliminary concluding remarks. 
 
 
1. Data on a generic example 
 
We motivate our modeling framework by considering a specific example: the passenger 
traffic modal competition on the link Cologne-Berlin in Germany. This O-D pair is 
appropriate for three main reasons. First, this link, which is a 600 km long route connecting 
two of the largest German cities from west to east of the country, represents a significant 
share of total long distance passenger traffic in Germany. Second, because of these 
geographical features, it involves a diversity of travelers (business, leisure…) which probably 
explains the differentiation in transport services provided between Cologne and Berlin. Not 
only there exist several transport modes, but there are also several active airlines. Three main 
passenger travel modes are available on this link: rail (DB), road and air. The air service is 
provided by three recently entered Low Cost Airlines (LCA), namely DBA, Germanwings 
(GW) and Hapag-Lloyd Express (HLA) on the market, in addition to Lufthansa (LH). The 
LCAs’ growing popularity is fueled by their offer of competitive prices, which, according to 
these airlines, are mainly driven by a low cost structure. This alternative is attractive as the air 
service is no longer an expensive solution while it is often considered as a faster transport 
mode than rail. Moreover, not only these LCAs are direct competitors to Lufthansa and DB, 
but, by challenging Lufthansa, they force this airline to enter in a fiercer competition with DB. 
Last not least the relation already experienced intramodal competition in passenger rail 
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transport. During 2003, Connex operated a daily service on the link. It was not very 
frequented and given up when Connex needed the rolling stock on another link with a public 
service contract. 
All these elements motivate our interest for analyzing the functioning of inter- and intra-
modal competition in this context and for simulating the effects of possible exit or entry on 
this market recently opened to competition on the rail segment, as well as the changes of 
public policy aiming for example at encouraging rail travel or reducing exhaust emissions. 
Most of the data on traffic, alternative characteristics and prices has been provided by 
Deutsche Bahn AG. For every transport mode and the two main categories of passengers 
(business and leisure), the price measured in Euros corresponds to the most common price 
that a representative customer usually pays for a trip between Cologne and Berlin. Concerning 
services characteristics, we have available speed measured in kilometers per minute (km/min), 
frequency per day, and capacity per day (seats available per trip). Some values for marginal 
costs are also provided by DB. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. 
 
 
2. The economic model 
 
In this section we present a framework for describing intra- and inter- modal competition 
between transport alternatives, with the example of the Cologne-Berlin link as a background. 
In the next section this model is calibrated using the data collected on this specific link and 
then it can be applied to evaluate the effects of exit or entry of a new competitor and the 
changes in product characteristics or in prices. 
In such a differentiated-products framework and oligopoly structure, firms are competing 
both in terms of prices and product characteristics. Here we focus on price competition 
assuming that, in the short run, product characteristics are fixed. First we describe the demand 
side, then we derive the pricing strategy of firms involved in a Bertrand-Nash competition.  
 
Demand side 
We consider the choices made by potential travelers willing to travel from Cologne to 
Berlin, in terms of mode and service provided. Three transport modes (rail, air, road) are 
present on the link, with a diversification on the air segment: three LCAs and the incumbent 
carrier, Lufthansa. The alternatives are characterized by a quality parameter and a price. 
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In addition we assume the existence of an outside alternative: Instead of choosing one of 
the services offered to travel from Cologne to Berlin, consumers may decide not to make the 
trip. Hence the total market size is defined as the number of consumers who would be 
potentially interested in making the trip. 
The potential travelers for a one way trip from Cologne to Berlin are heterogeneous. We 
consider two main categories in the passengers’ population: business and leisure travelers. 
They differ for example by their requirements in terms of schedules and prices. In what 
follows, we account for these two types of passengers by considering two separate markets: 
the business market and the leisure market. There are NB (respectively, NL) potential travelers 
on the business (leisure) market who may either travel using one of the transport services 
supplied, or otherwise choose not to travel (the outside alternative). In the sequel, the two 
markets are treated symmetrically and we skip indexes B and L without loss of generality. 
Assume that each consumer makes its choice in a sequential way: she decides about the 
transport mode and then the service to travel with. The consumer choice structure is depicted 
in Appendix 1. A choice, i.e., an alternative or a product is then a combination of a transport 
mode and a service provided by a transport operator. Note that for road, the transport operator 
is the driver in her car. There are J alternatives classified into G groups. Here we have four 
groups 0,1,...,g G=  where group 0 corresponds to the outside alternative (herein, OG), the 
other groups correspond to the ones of three modes, i.e., rail, air, road. 
Consumers’ utility depends on quality and prices. We attribute a quality index ψj, and a 
price pj, to every alternative. The utility function associated with alternative j ( 1, 2,...,j J= ) is 
written as follows: 
 
 ij j ijU V ε= + , (1) 
 
where iV  represents the mean utility level common to every passenger (the deterministic part) 
and ijε  (the random part) corresponds to the departure of consumer i from the common utility 
level, specific to product j, i.e., to the unknown consumer i’s tastes on product j. This mean 
utility level can be further decomposed as: 
 
 ,j j jV hpψ= −  (2) 
 
where h represents the sensitivity of utility to price, or marginal utility of income. 
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We adopt here a nested logit specification for the random preferences. In this framework, 
products within the same group are closer substitutes than products from different groups. To 
allow for this dependence and correlation between the utilities of alternatives in common 
groups, the random part can be specified as the weighted sum of unobserved variables, which 
represent consumer i’s taste for any alternative belonging to group g: 
 
 ( )1 , 1,...,ij ig ij i Nε σν σ ν= + − ∀ =  (3) 
 
The parameter σ  is to be estimated and gives a measure of degree of correlation between 
alternatives belonging to the same group: The higher σ , the higher the correlation between 
alternatives of the same group. The parameter σ  must lie between 0 and 1. For this reason, σ  
is the degree of intragroup correlation. The random components igν  and ijν  are assumed to 
be distributed such that each term, and consequently ijε , has the standard extreme value 
distribution. 
The consumer chooses the utility-maximizing alternative j  belonging to group g that 
satisfies: 
 
 , ' .ij ijU U j j′≥ ∀ ≠  (4) 
 
Given the preceding specification of the random indirect utility function, the distribution 
assumptions on the error terms, the consumer’s choice, and assuming that the mean utility of 
the outside good is set to 0, we can compute the probability of choosing alternative j from the 
probability of choosing group g and the probability of choosing alternative j conditional on 
choosing group g. Applying the methodology proposed by Berry (1994) which consists in 
expressing the mean utility level as a function of observed market shares that are replaced 
measures of choice probabilities, we derive the specification of demands associated with each 
alternative: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )0 /ln ln lnj j j j gs s hp sψ σ− = − + , (5) 
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where the market shares js  and /j gs  are defined as ,
j
j
q
s
N
=  and / jj g
g
q
s
N
= , 0,1,...,j J= , 
respectively, where in turn, qj is the quantity of product j on the market (either business or 
leisure), N is the size of that market and Ng the size of market segment g. With this 
specification, we obtain the own price elasticities of demand as 
 
 /
1
1 1
j j
j j j j g
j j
dq p
hp s s j g
dp q
ση σ σ
 = × = − + ∀ ∈ − −  . (6) 
 
Supply side 
In our framework, each firm provides one product, i.e., one transport service for the city-
pair. First, we consider the mode-service ‘road and car’ as offered by a firm competing with 
the other alternatives. Second, for all other transport services supplied on the city-pair under 
consideration, firms choose transport prices in order to maximize profits, knowing that their 
competitors do the same2.  
 
 ( )j j j jp c q Kπ = − −  (7) 
 
where K represents fixed costs. They enter in a Bertrand-Nash competition. As in Ivaldi and 
Verboven (2004), the outcome of this Nash equilibrium is defined by a set of J necessary first 
order conditions: 
 
 ( )( )/
1
1 1j j j g j
p c
h s s
σ
σ σ
−= + − − −  (8) 
 
where /j gs  is the market share of alternative j in group g and js  is the market share of 
alternative f in the total market. The price of product j is equal to the marginal cost of product 
j plus a markup term. 
 The solution to the equilibrium is obtained by solving the system of Equations (5) and (8). 
3. Calibration 
                                                 
2 One may question the assumption that the service “road and car” is provided by a profit maximizing firm. 
Alternatively we could have assumed that the firm sets the price just to cover average cost. When we estimate a 
model in which prices for car are set equal to average costs, we do not find a significant difference with the case 
of profit maximizing firms. 
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As a set of consistent data collected on a regular basis is not available here, we cannot 
proceed to the statistical estimation of the previous equilibrium model. We propose instead to 
calibrate it using some data on prices, markets shares, characteristics of transport services, and 
some values for marginal costs. All the computations for the calibration and later, the 
simulations, are achieved using the GAUSS software. 
The system is solved numerically which allows us to compute demand parameters, as well 
as demand elasticities, consumer surplus and marginal costs. Given the available data and the 
structure of the model, several steps are needed for the calibration. 
First, the demand parameters h and σ  are computed by inverting the expressions for 
elasticities as defined in Equation (6). Then, firms’ marginal costs are recovered using the 
markup defined by Equation (8) and the calibrated values for h and σ . However, some care 
has to be taken to achieve this step of computations, as we do not have data on elasticities and 
we only know some values for marginal costs for the leisure market. We generate repeatedly a 
random vector of elasticities making some reasonable assumptions on their distribution using 
estimates of transport elasticities available in the literature (Oum, Waters and Young, 1990). 
For each draw, we are able to associate a value for parameters h and σ  and to compute 
marginal costs. This procedure is repeated until we find a vector for marginal cost as close as 
possible from the values of marginal costs that we already know. We keep the latest values for 
h, σ , and the values of elasticities and marginal costs. For the business market, this procedure 
cannot be applied as marginal costs are unknown for that market so that the model can not be 
calibrated as precisely as for the leisure market.  
 Second, at this point we are able to calculate the values for the quality parameters, jψ , by 
inverting the equations defining market shares in Equation (5). Now we are interested in 
finding the weight associated to each component that enters in the quality index. We consider 
three standard dimensions of transport service quality: speed, frequency and capacity. Given 
the known values for these components of all transport services, we solve numerically a 
system of linear equations to recover the weights which allows us to derive consumers’ 
valuations for the different components of quality. 
 A detailed description of computations is provided in Appendix 3. Applying this 
procedure yields the results gathered in Table 2. 
 As mentioned earlier, we consider two separate markets: one for business travelers and 
one for leisure travelers. We also assume that the share of the outside alternative, i.e., 
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customers who do not travel, represents 15%, 30% or 60% of the total population of potential 
travelers, i.e., the market size. The first half of Table 2 presents the values of market shares of 
the different alternatives, measured according to our market size based on potential travelers. 
Then Table 2 provides the values of two parameters of consumers’ utility function: marginal 
utility of income and coefficient of intragroup correlation. The first one is interpreted as the 
sensitivity of utility to price. We can read that it is higher for leisure passengers (h≈0.030) 
than for business passengers (h≈0.016), as we could expect. The second parameter is a 
measure of correlation of alternatives belonging to the same mode. This parameter being 
closer to zero than to one (0.20 < σ < 0.40) in both markets, we conclude that customers do 
not value more the mode than the alternative itself. (See the definition of σ in Section 2.) This 
may be due to the fact that there is not much variability between Low Costs Airlines 
attributes, or that LCAs can be interpreted as substitutes for land transports as well. 
Table 2 also provides estimates for own price elasticities of demand. First, note that these 
values are specific to the Cologne-Berlin city-pair and as such, they may not be comparable to 
national level measures. Indeed, here the traffic distribution between modes and types is 
different from what we observe from time series tables for European countries (European 
Commission: Energy and Transport in figures, 2003). In addition, on this link the degree of 
competition is higher, leading to higher elasticities (within Germany, other OD pairs are 
operated by less than 3 airlines). Second, we can see that the ranking of these elasticities with 
respect to services differs with passengers types. For business travelers the elasticity is higher 
for airlines services, whereas it is higher for car in the leisure segment. This result helps us 
deciding what should be the most probable value for the market share associated with the 
outside alternative. If we refer to the values of elasticities provided by Oum, Waters and 
Young (1990), a reasonable configuration would be to consider that non-travelers represent 
15% of the business market and 30% of the leisure market. 
Finally, Table 2 provides the values for consumer surplus showing that the consumer 
surplus derived from traveling decreases as the number of non-travelers increases. 
Table 3 summarizes the measures of quality of service. The upper part of Table 3 displays 
the values for the quality effect of each provider of transport service on the consumers’ utility. 
Note again a discrepancy between the two categories of travelers. Business passengers value 
more a service provided by Lufthansa or another airline than any other mode. On the contrary, 
leisure passengers are more attracted to train or car services than to airlines. This is quite 
intuitive, as schedules and travel time matter a lot for someone on a business trip, compared to 
someone on a leisure trip. 
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The second half of Table 3 provides the valuations of the different components of quality. 
Recall that the quality index is expressed as the weighted sum of components affecting quality 
(idiosyncratic effect of the transport service provider, speed, frequency, capacity). The 
parameters associated with the alternative-specific dummy variables have to be interpreted as 
a fixed effect on quality once the effects of speed, frequency and capacity are taken into 
account, relatively to the quality of the omitted mode, car. It is not surprising to find a high 
negative coefficient for the Lufthansa dummy, as all attractive aspects of quality for this 
operator have already been accounted for (speed, frequency and capacity), and, what remains, 
is flexibility, possibility to stop during the trip for example, for which car performs better. The 
weights are then transformed into a monetary valuation of these different components of 
quality for each of the two categories of travelers. Consider the case where the outside 
alternative has a market share of 15% on the business market and 30% on the leisure market. 
The values for the quality characteristics are interpreted as follows. For business travelers, an 
increase in speed by 1 kilometer per minute, or 60 kilometers per hour, is equivalent to a 
reduction in price by 58.75 Euros, while for leisure travelers it is equivalent to a price 
reduction of 30.3 Euros. Business passengers have a higher valuation for speed than leisure 
passengers do. If we look at a unit positive variation in the alternatives respective frequencies, 
we find on the business market that it has the same effect as reducing price by 0.4 Euros for 
DB, 1.4 Euros for DBA, 3.3 Euros for HLX, 5 Euros for GW and 1.1 Euros for LH. These 
effects are similar on the leisure market. Moreover, increasing the frequency of DB service by 
2 for business travelers is equivalent to increase speed by 0.7 km/h, and this corresponds to a 
price reduction of 0.67 Euro. Business travelers are almost indifferent in a frequency 
improvement of train service. However, adding 2 more flights per day to the GW schedules 
results in the same increase in utility as a 8.3 km/h faster trip or a reduction of 8.2 Euros in the 
plane ticket. This is due to the fact that business travelers favor air transport more than land 
transport and that DB has already a high number of daily trips compared to GW. There is a 
decreasing marginal utility to frequency. Overall these results comfort our intuition. We can 
now move on and use the model for simulating counterfactual experiments. 
 
 
 
 
4. Simulations 
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Once the equilibrium parameters are known, simulations for new market configuration 
can be run. The impact of any change in prices, quality characteristics, marginal costs, or even 
the entry or exit of a competitor can be measured, in terms of variations in the other firms’ 
prices and market shares. 
 
The entry of InterConnex on the Cologne-Berlin link 
The train operator Connex decided to operate on the market in 2002 and exited in 2003. 
Simulate this entry allows us to measure the effects on all the competitors, to account for their 
price reactions, and so to evaluate the commercial feasibility of this entry. We find that the 
market shares of Connex are expected to be very low, this being mainly due to a low service 
quality level offered to travelers, particularly with respect to travel time, and to price levels 
not being as attractive as LCAs. In some sense, our model explains the effective exit of 
Connex.3 
 
Entry of Low Cost Airlines in 2001 
In order to validate the prediction power of our model, we apply it to the same market in 
2001, before the entry of LCAs. At that time, only DB, DBA and Lufthansa were operating 
the market, and the cost structure of DBA was closer to the one of a regular company. We 
look here at the impact of the entry of two LCAs, namely HLX and GW, on the market in 
2002, taking into account the changes in costs for DBA being considered now as an additional 
LCA. Having information on these entrants’ characteristics and marginal costs, we are able to 
measure the reaction in terms of prices for the different competitors and derive the 
corresponding market shares. Some remarks have to be made on the methodology. First, for 
identification reasons, we normalize the components of quality: speed, frequency and 
capacity, by setting their mean to 0 and standard deviation to 1. Second, we focus on the 
leisure market, first because LCAs are targeting this market and second because we do not 
have information on marginal costs for the business category, which makes the calibration 
less precise. This lack of information becomes crucial, when instead of just looking at 
changes in equilibrium values, we need predictions of exact magnitudes. Finally, when 
presenting the results, we assume that the share of potential travelers in 2001 can take the 
values 20%, 35% and 65% to account for traffic induced by LCAs leading to a smaller share 
                                                 
3 It should be noted, however, that the Interconnex service was not primarily directed at Cologne-Berlin 
travelers. But apparently, the market share on intermediate ODs was not on a sustainable level either. 
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of the outside alternative in 2003. This allows us to compare the predicted market shares with 
the one we observe in 2003. The results are presented in Table 4. 
By comparing the predicted market shares to observed market shares provided in Table 2, 
we can see that they are very close. For example, with a 30% share of the alternative, the 
observed market shares for airlines go from 3.5% to 6.4%, the predicted ones from 3.9% to 
6.5%, and the ranking between alternatives is the same. Predicted prices are also very similar 
to what we observe, between 46 Euros and 52 Euros for LCAs. 
 
On-rail competition: The entry of a Low Cost Train 
Our third simulation consists in a structural change in the market, directly related to the 
liberalization process in the railways industry. We evaluate the consequences of the entry of a 
new operator on the link, providing exactly the same service as DB’s, but benefiting from a 
more efficient cost structure: this new entrant is assumed to face half DB’s marginal costs. 
We call this competitor Low Cost Train, and the results are presented in Table 5. 
What happens in this context of tougher competition? First, prices decrease for all 
alternatives, particularly for the railway company in place, and specifically on the leisure 
market where passengers favor this transport mode: prices drop by more than 20%. Secondly, 
this has the expected effect on market shares for all firms already on the market: they all loose 
traffic and this appears to be of particular magnitude for airlines on the leisure side, where we 
observe a fall of 20% to 50% depending on the share of the outside alternative. This new 
competitor affects more the different airlines than it affects DB, which looses less than 20% 
of its market share. The mechanisms here are the following ones. A new competitor starts to 
operate the link proposing very competitive fares, thanks to low marginal costs. The entrant 
has the same characteristics as DB’s and offers tariffs closer (even lower) to Low Costs 
Airlines’. On the business market, where land transport is less appreciated by customers, we 
observe a moderate reaction of airlines for which the threat of a new train, even with low 
tariffs, is not of major impact. The more harmful consequences for firms of such a new 
market configuration concern traffic on the leisure segment. Before the entry of the Low Cost 
Train, people were more willing to travel by train than any other mode, speaking in terms of 
quality as shown in Table 3, but even so some passengers were attracted by the lower tariffs 
offered by airlines. Now, there is this new train, providing exactly the same service as DB’s, 
then highly valued by customers, which proposes prices even smaller than the ones of Low 
Cost Airlines, not being able to reduce their prices of such an amount. The Low Cost train 
ends up capturing a significant proportion of the traffic. However the incumbent train operator 
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is not totally driven out of the market and this can be explained by some external 
considerations for the consumers, like switching costs or imprecise information on the price 
differential which would lead travelers to choose the LCT. Capacity constraints on the link 
can also allow the two trains to operate the link. These effects, unobservable in our 
specification, could be identified if we had additional data. 
A very significant effect to be underlined here concerns the portion of potential travelers 
preferring not to make the trip. This new alternative being less expensive, it forces firms 
already on the market to reduce their prices, and this has the global effect to induce traffic on 
both the existing market, and to a higher extent on the leisure segment. We can read on the 
table that changes in the outside option market share are negative and of substantial 
magnitude, between 20% and 50%. From this follows an improvement in consumer surplus, 
which is of considerable magnitude on the leisure market. 
 
Effect of a new kerosene tax 
Our fourth simulation here consists in evaluating the effects of a change in the regulatory 
framework, for example here an environmental measure aiming at reducing exhaust 
emissions: the introduction of a kerosene tax of 65.45 cent/litre amounting to airlines cost 
increases (per pass-km) by 15%. The results are presented in Table 6. We can notice first that 
this increase in airlines costs induces an increase in their prices by nearly 10%. This is also 
true for the other modes even if to a smaller extent. Expecting these higher prices the railway 
company anticipates a gain in traffic and increases its fares by a small amount to make more 
profit. This phenomenon is verified in the two markets, but is slightly more pronounced in the 
business market, where fares are higher because air carriers know that business passengers are 
less sensitive to variations in prices than leisure travelers. These changes in tariffs imply 
changes in demand and market shares, and as expected we find that airlines loose some 
relatively high proportions of traffic, between 7% and 18% for LCAs and between 20% and 
35% for LH. These losses are partly transferred to other modes and even to the outside 
alternative category. These higher prices and loss in global traffic have a negative impact on 
consumer surplus if the induced environmental relief is not taken into account. 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
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A first important conclusion to be drawn from this study concerns competition policy in 
the transport industry. To evaluate the effectiveness of competition on a particular market of 
transport services, we need to account for all potential travelers, all modes and all firms. This 
result should be useful for defining relevant markets. A second important conclusion is that, 
based on our framework and the lessons drawn from the counterfactual experiments we have 
discussed, a small number of competitors is enough to create a high degree of competition. 
The model and methodology elaborated in this study constitute a useful and practical tool 
in the evaluation of market changes, both from firms and regulator viewpoints. This 
instrument allows us to predict market outcomes and welfare effects following some political 
or structural changes. Note that it can be applied in cases of oligopolistic competition when 
detailed data are not available. 
If the method has proved to be performing well already, some more work is needed to 
capture specific or hidden effects, by relaxing some assumptions of our model. For instance, it 
would be interesting to incorporate flexible forms for the marginal costs, instead of 
considering them as constant, to introduce non linear prices as this is more appropriate to both 
air and train pricing, or to consider a larger network, with more than two nodes and a more 
complex structure of hubs and spokes. 
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APPENDIX 1: Consumer choices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RAIL OG ROAD AIR
DB DBA HLX GW LH CAR
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APPENDIX 2: Tables 
 
Table 1. Data on the link Cologne-Berlin. 
 
Alternatives 
Shares % Prices Euros Marginal Costs*  
Traffic 
Modal 
Shares % Business Leisure Business Leisure
Speed 
Km/Min
Frequency 
Trips/Day 
Capacity 
Seats/Trip 
Business Leisure 
Rail DB 31.1 15.7 51.4 90.0 60.0 138.5 16 736 na 13 
DBA 14.8 19.2 9.1 169.0 51.2 404.6 8 136 na 26 
HLX 13.8 17.8 8.4 169.0 46.7 404.6 5 169 na 26 
GW 8.2 10.6 5.0 169.0 46.1 404.6 4 111 na 26 
Air 
LH 14.3 18.5 8.7 240.0 53.4 404.6 9 123 na na 
Car Car 17.9 18.2 17.4 110.0 80.0 114.5 Infinity Infinity na na 
* Estimates provided by DB. 
 
 
Table 2. Equilibrium outcomes. 
 
   
   BUSINESS LEISURE  
Share of the outside alternative 15% 30% 60% 15% 30% 60% 
Rail DB 13.3 10.1 6.3 43.7 36 20.6 
DBA 16.3 13.4 7.7 7.7 6.4 3.6 
HLX 15.1 12.4 7.1 7.1 5.9 3.4 
GW 9 7.4 4.2 4.3 3.5 2 
Air 
LH 15.7 12.9 7.4 7.4 6.1 3.5 
Car Car 15.5 12.7 7.3 14.8 12.2 7 
Market 
Shares 
 % 
Outside alternative 15 30 60 15 30 60 
Marginal Utility of Income 0.016 0.015 0.017 0.038 0.032 0.026 
Coeff. of Within Group 
Correlation  0.21 0.22 0.36 0.25 0.26 0.28 
Rail DB -1.25 -1.21 -1.3 -1.29 -1.25 -1.23 
DBA -2.77 -2.71 -3.41 -2.26 -1.98 -1.63 
HLX -2.82 -1.96 -3.46 -2.08 -1.82 -1.5 
GW -3.06 -1.55 -3.69 -2.18 -1.9 -1.54 
Air 
LH -3.96 -3.05 -4.88 -2.38 -2.08 -1.7 
Own Price 
Elasticities 
Car Car -1.49 -1.44 -1.56 -2.6 -2.28 -1.92 
Consumer Surplus 118 80 33 50 37 20 
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 Table 3. Calibration of the quality index and its components. 
 
   
   
BUSINESS             LEISURE               
Share of the outside alternative 15% 30% 60% 15% 30% 60% 
Rail DB 1.33 0.35 -0.87 3.36 2.13 0.47 
DBA 3.05 2.01 0.98 1.6 0.44 -1.14 
HLX 2.99 1.96 0.93 1.37 0.23 -1.32 
GW 2.58 1.55 0.6 0.96 -0.16 -1.71 
Air 
LH 4.16 3.06 2.04 1.65 0.47 -1.12 
Quality,  
Mode Ranking 
Car Car 1.8 0.8 -0.42 3.04 1.7 -0.09 
DB Dummy -2.78 -2.35 -1.85 -1.85 -1.5 -1.14 
LCA Dummy -14 -10.28 -5.72 -18.4 -15.01 -10.9 
LH Dummy -14.1 -10.21 -5.61 -19.43 -16.0 -12.1 
Speed 0.94 0.46 -0.25 1.58 0.97 -0.002 
1 / Frequency -1.57 -1.38 -1.22 -3.94 -3.67 -3.29 
Quality 
 characteristics 
1 / Capacity 1499.9 1313.2 1168 1320.5 1275.1 1392.9
 
 
Table 4: Simulation of the entry of Low Cost Airlines in 2002. 
 
   
   
LEISURE 
Share of the outside 
alternative 20% 35% 65% 
Changes: values, % Value Change% Value
Change
% Value 
Change 
% 
Rail DB 57.5 -4.3% 58.5 -2.5% 59.6 -0.61% 
DBA 52.7 -12.2% 51.7 -13.7% 51.9 -13.4% 
HLX 46.9  45.6  46.1  
GW 47.7  46.2  46.8  
Air 
LH 69.3 -0.92% 66.2 -5.44% 67.5 -3.5% 
Prices 
Car Car 79.3 -0.92% 79.5 -0.57% 79.8 -0.14% 
Rail DB 41.6 -8.8% 35 -5.4% 19 -4.41% 
DBA 9.2 14.45% 6.5 -0.54% 4 13.3% 
HLX 6.1  4.7  2.8  
GW 5.2  3.9  2.4  
Air 
LH 8.5 -18.5% 6.5 -23.1% 3.8 -16.4% 
Car Car 13.3 -16.6% 11.9 -8.6% 6.6 -5.3% 
Market 
Shares  
% 
Outside alternative 16 -19.6% 31.5 -9.9% 61.3 -5.7% 
Consumer Surplus 36.8  35.9  13.2  
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Table 5. Simulation of the entry of a Low Cost Train. 
 
   
   
BUSINESS LEISURE 
Share of the outside 
alternative 15% 30% 60% 15% 30% 60% 
Changes: values, % Value Change% Value
Change
% Value
Change 
% Value
Change
% Value
Change
% Value
Change
% 
Rail DB 79.00 -12.2% 78.6 -12.7% 72.7 -19.2% 44.2 -26.4% 45.7 -23.8% 48.9 -18.5%
 New Train 72.20  72.6  65.2  40.9  42.5  45.2  
DBA 167.80 -0.7% 168.2 -0.5% 168.8 -0.11% 50.5 -1.4% 50.7 -1.0% 51 -0.4%
HLX 167.90 -0.7% 168.3 -0.4% 168.8 -0.10% 46 -1.4% 46.2 -1.0% 46.5 -0.4%
GW 168.40 -0.4% 168.6 -0.2% 168.9 -0.06% 45.8 -0.8% 45.9 -0.6% 46 -0.2%
Air 
LH 238.80 -0.5% 239.2 -0.3% 240 -0.07% 52.7 -1.3% 52.9 -0.9% 53.2 -0.3%
Prices 
Car Car 108.40 -1.5% 108.9 -1.0% 109.6 -0.32% 77.7 -2.8% 78.3 -2.1% 79.4 -0.8%
DB 11.6 -13.1% 9.8 -11.1% 5.7 -8% 32.6 -25.4% 28.2 -21.6% 17.5 -15.0%Rail 
New Train 13.3  10.9  6.9  38.5  32.5  19.9  
DBA 14.2 -13.0% 12 -10.5% 7.2 -6.60% 3.9 -49.0% 3.9 -38.6% 2.9 -20.9%
HLX 13.1 -13.2% 11.1 -10.6% 6.6 -6.60% 3.6 -49.2% 3.6 -38.7% 2.7 -21.0%
GW 7.7 -14.0% 6.6 -11.2% 4 -6.80% 2.1 -50.0% 2.1 -39.2% 1.6 -21.1%
Air 
LH 13.7 -13.1% 11.6 -10.6% 6.9 -6.60% 3.8 -49.1% 3.7 -38.6% 2.8 -20.9%
Car Car 13.5 -12.4% 11.4 -10.1% 6.8 -6.40% 8 -46.0% 7.8 -36.2% 5.6 -20.0%
Market 
Shares  
% 
Outside alternative 12.8 -14.7% 26 -11.7% 55.8 -7% 7.4 -50.5% 18.1 -39.6% 47.2 -21.3%
Consumer Surplus 128.00 8% 88 10% 38 15% 68 36% 53 43% 29 45% 
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Table 6. Simulation of the effect of a kerosene tax. 
 
   
   
BUSINESS  LEISURE  
Share of the outside 
alternative 15% 30% 60% 15% 30% 60% 
Changes: values, % Value Change% Value
Change
% Value
Change 
% Value
Change
% Value
Change
% Value
Change
% 
Rail DB 91.7 1.84% 91 1.2% 90.3 0.37% 60.8 1.38% 60.4 0.72% 60.1 0.14%
DBA 184.7 9.30% 184.5 9.2% 186.8 10.50% 55.3 8% 54.9 7.20% 54.1 5.64%
HLX 184.9 9.40% 184.6 9.3% 186.9 10.60% 50.2 7.70% 49.8 6.70% 49 5.00%
GW 185.7 9.90% 185.4 9.7% 187.4 10.90% 49.8 8.00% 49.4 7.00% 48.6 5.30%
Air 
LH 264.4 10.20% 264.5 10.2% 266.9 11.20% 57.8 8.30% 57.3 7.50% 56.5 6.00%
Prices 
Car Car 112.0 1.80% 111.2 1.1% 110.4 0.35% 80.2 0.30% 80.1 0.16% 80.03 0.03%
Rail DB 15.3 14.6% 12.2 11.1% 6.7 7.10% 44.6 2.25% 36.5 1.58% 20.7 0.68%
DBA 15.1 -7.5% 12.1 -9.6% 6.4 -16% 6.9 -10.00% 5.8 -8.71% 3.4 -6.50%
HLX 13.9 -7.8% 11.2 -9.9% 5.9 -16.50% 6.6 -7.50% 5.5 -6.47% 3.2 -4.60%
GW 8.2 -9.4% 6.6 -11.3% 3.5 -17.40% 3.9 -8.02% 3.3 -6.97% 1.9 -4.90%
Air 
LH 12.2 -22.5% 9.8 -24.0% 5 -33% 6.6 -11.40% 5.5 -10% 3.2 -7.50%
Car Car 17.7 14.1% 14.1 10.8% 7.8 7.05% 15.4 4.60% 12.5 2.60% 7 0.80%
Market 
Shares% 
Outside 
alternative 17.6 17.7% 33.9 12.9% 64.6 8% 15.8 6% 31 3% 60.5 1% 
Consumer Surplus 108.00 -8% 72 -10% 29 -12% 48 -4% 36 -3% 19.5 -3% 
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APPENDIX 3: Model Calibration. 
 
Step 1 
The choice structure studied here comprises the six existing alternatives to go from 
Cologne to Berlin. There are six own-price elasticity equations and we solve the system for h 
andσ . Recall that we do not have values for the elasticities. 
To deal with these identification problems, we start by re-parameterizing the model in the 
following way: 
 
 
( ) ( )
/
/
1 ,
1 1j j j j g
j j j j j j g j
hp p s
a p s p b p s p
ση σ σ
η
 = − + − − 
= − + −
 (A.1) 
 
with a h=  and b
a b
σ = + . 
Next, we generate repeatedly (K=1000 times) a random vector of elasticities, normally 
distributed. The mean of the distribution was chosen to be close to the values we find in the 
literature (Oum, Waters and Young, 1990). We find the parameters a and b which minimize 
the average difference between the random vectors of elasticities and their associated 
expression provided in Equation (A.1), i.e., which are solutions of the following program: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )26 /, 1 1
K
k
j j j j j j g ja b k j
Min a p s p b p s pη
= =
  − − − −      ∑ ∑ . (A.2) 
 
We are able to form 95% confidence intervals for these parameters. We obtain: 
 
 
0.030 0.034
0.010 0.015
a
b
≤ ≤
≤ ≤  (A.3) 
 
Then we solve for values for h andσ . 
 
Step 2 
We compute the marginal costs according to the system defined by Equations (A.4): 
 
 
/
1
(1 (1 ) )j j f g f
c p
h s s
σ
σ σ
−= − − − −  (A.4) 
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This procedure is repeated until we find a vector for marginal cost as close as possible to 
the values of marginal costs that we already know. We keep the latest values for h, σ , and the 
values of elasticities and marginal costs. 
 
Step 3 
It is straightforward to solve for the weight of components of the quality index using the 
system of Equations (A.5): 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )/ 0ln ln lnj j j g jhp s s sψ σ= − + − −  (A.5) 
 
Step 4 
We can express this aggregate measure of quality as the weighted sum of the 
characteristics of alternatives. We find the different parameters associated with them by 
solving the following system of six equations and six unknowns: 
 
 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 11 2 3j j j j j
j j
D D D speed
freq cap
ψ α α α β β β   = + + + + +         
 (A.6) 
 
with variable D1 taking value 1 if j=DB, variable D2 taking value 1 if j=DBA, HLX, or GW 
and variable D3 taking value 1 if j=LH. The argument for this is the existing differences 
between LCAs and the LH, even if classified in the same group. The measures of frequency 
and capacity are inverted to take into account the specificity of the alternative “car”, for which 
we can consider infinite frequencies and capacities. 
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